Taipei, January 1 (Channel News Asia): On January 13, close to 20 million Taiwanese will get to vote for their next President.
Who they choose will have an impact on regional and even global stability as relations between Taiwan and China are a major geopolitical flashpoint amid superpower rivalry between China and the United States, one of Taiwan’s most important allies.
The frontrunner is Mr William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is seen as more independence-leaning, while his closest rival is Mr Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), which is seen as more Beijing-friendly.
A survey done by My Formosa released on December 28 found support for Mr Lai at 40 per cent, and support for Mr Hou at 28.9 per cent. Support for the third candidate, Dr Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), was 17.6 per cent.
China, which sees Taiwan as part of its territory to be unified by force if necessary, has also dialled up economic pressure in recent weeks while refraining from large-scale military activity.
After an investigation, it said on December 15, that Taiwan had violated a trade agreement, and announced the end of tariff cuts on some chemical imports from the island. On December 27, it threatened more trade sanctions if the DPP “stubbornly” adhered to supporting independence.
Foreign Policy
How will the three candidates conduct Taiwan’s foreign policy and cross-Taiwan strait relations if they become president? What could be the best-case and worst-case scenarios for the island under each of them? CNA got experts to weigh in.
WILLIAM LAI CHING-TE (DPP)
Frostiness and friction with Beijing are likely to continue if Mr Lai, the 64-year-old current Vice-President, wins.
China cut off formal dialogue with Taiwan after Ms Tsai Ing-wen was elected in 2016, and has labelled Mr Lai – who has called himself a “practical worker for Taiwan independence” in the past – a separatist and troublemaker.
“I think the People’s Republic of China government studies his past quite carefully and knows that he is considered one of the ‘Deep Green’ proponents for independence,” said Dr Huang Chin-Hao, author of “Power and Restraint in China’s Rise” and Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS).
“It’s very hard for the Chinese government to accept any DPP candidate as a party with (whom) they can negotiate in good faith, just because the party itself represents a separate, distinct identity, a way of breaking away from China.”
That said, the DPP has been moving away from declaring de jure independence – independence as a matter of law – to upholding the status quo, which is more reflective of the general Taiwanese public’s wishes, Dr Huang noted.
Although Mr Lai is expected to continue with President Tsai’s “relatively moderate” foreign policy and cross-strait approach, the lack of dialogue with Beijing means the “risk for misunderstanding and misperception will continue”, embedding a “residual degree of instability” in the Taiwan Strait, said Associate Professor Hoo Tiang Boon of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
The DPP says it wants to pursue dialogue with China, but without preconditions; China’s prerequisites are for Taiwan to make clear it has no intention of seeking formal independence, and for it to endorse an agreement called the “1992 Consensus.”
The 1992 Consensus, forged between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, states there is only “one China” but each side has different opinions as to what it means. The DPP rejects the Consensus.
If Mr Lai wins, Taiwan-China relations will likely deteriorate further because Beijing will very likely increase military and economic pressure to “prevent Lai from announcing radical moves in his inauguration speech”, said Dr Qi Dongtao, senior research fellow at the NUS’ East Asian Institute.
If he wins, Taiwan is also likely to continue President Tsai’s “New Southbound Policy” of deepening trade, investment and people-to-people ties with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australia and New Zealand, the experts said.
This policy seeks to diversify Taiwan’s economic relations and reduce economic dependence on China.
In 2022, Taiwan’s investments to Southeast and South Asia exceeded that to China for the first time. It reached US$ 5.2 billion, exceeding the US$ 5 billion invested in China over the same period.
BEST-CASE SCENARIO IF MR.LAI WINS:
The best-case scenario is if Mr Lai wins is that he will work with Washington and Beijing to find a way acceptable to the three parties to prevent escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Dr Qi said.
For Dr Huang, it is if the DPP government works with the KMT and identifies a diplomat or statesperson trusted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait, who can “jumpstart any sort of cross-strait dialogue and discussion or negotiation”, said Dr Huang.
“It certainly cannot be somebody who has a DPP or ‘Green’ kind of background, so it most likely will have to be somebody who represents a large common denominator with the KMT,” he said.
“Someone that’s acceptable to both sides and, importantly, somebody who Beijing can take seriously and would be willing to negotiate with as well.”
Dr Huang cited the appointment of Mr David Lee Ta-wei, an experienced KMT diplomat, as chairman of the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation, which manages cross-strait technical and business affairs, as an example. Prior to the January 2023 appointment, Mr Lee was secretary-general to the President.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO IF MR.LAI WINS:
Mr.Lai may not be as “extreme” as former President Chen Shui-bian (2000 to 2008) – who supported referendums such as one asking if Taiwan should seek United Nations membership under the name “Taiwan” instead of using its formal name, the Republic of China – but could nonetheless be willing to accept risks such as requesting for certain weapons the Americans have been less willing to provide.
For Dr Huang, the worst-case scenario would be China using force to unify Taiwan in the next 10 or 20 years, when it “feels it has the necessary capabilities (and) feels confident enough that it can do a very quick, decisive and swift military option or tactic”.
In the near term, barring unprecedented actions by a potential DPP government, it is probably highly unlikely such a decision would be taken, he said.
He added that Chinese experts would have carefully studied the Ukraine-Russia conflict, which has shown a quick decisive victory is very difficult, as well as the political, social, reputational and economic costs exacted.
HOU YU-IH (KMT)
Cross-strait tensions will certainly decrease if Mr Hou, 66, wins the presidency, experts believe.
Mr Hou and his party have framed the 2024 election as a choice between war and peace. If he wins, China will resume official dialogue because Hou accepts the 1992 Consensus, noted Dr Qi.
Mr Hou will likely follow former President Ma Ying-jeou’s approach to dealing with Beijing and Washington, carefully improving relations with Beijing without losing autonomy, added Dr Qi.
Under Mr Ma (2008 to 2016), Taiwan and China signed 23 cooperation treaties. He even met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore in 2015, the first between leaders of the two sides since the Chinese civil war ended in 1949.
KMT senior officials including Mr Ma have also been making trips to China to meet with key figures in the Chinese government, noted Dr Huang. If Mr Hou wins, the KMT officials in charge of these visits would be “very quick to adapt to the situation” and occupy key cross-strait government positions.
“I think there’s probably going to be an emphasis first on forging pragmatic cooperative ties on functional issues,” he said. This could include jumpstarting trade agreements or having some sort of understanding that there will be greater international space for Taiwan in public health and, possibly, the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Such issues would enable the KMT to show it is a government able to bring tangible benefits to the electorate.
What is One China?
The “most sensitive part, this question about what ‘Pne China’ actually is”, may not be talked about immediately, Dr Huang reckoned.
For the US, a KMT win is “not a bad development either”. It reduces the likelihood of having to “worry about Taiwan and getting drawn into an unnecessary conflict in the Taiwan Strait”, he said.
There may, however, be the concern that Taiwan would be “pulled into China’s orbit more closely and so it would lose its strategic ally and partner”.
Taiwan will continue to buy arms from the US to improve its defence capability, as Mr Hou would still need the US and other countries’ support in resisting Beijing’s unification efforts, said Dr Qi.
For Southeast Asia, a win for Hou would mean less pressure to choose between supporting Beijing, or supporting Taiwan or the US, in the unlikely event of a conflict, the analysts said.
“If the KMT government were to be elected, I think there would probably be a temporary sigh of relief for most Southeast Asian governments (which) don’t have to be wedged in between this conflict between China and Taiwan,” said Dr Huang.
Mr Hou, a career police officer, has said he wants to expand the “New Southbound Initiative” to encompass the entire Indo-Pacific region, noted Dr Jing Bo-jiun, senior research fellow in Taiwan Studies at the University of Oxford.
At a press event in December, Mr Hou said the DPP’s New Southbound Policy was not working as claimed by the ruling party, and proposed expanding its focus.
BEST-CASE SCENARIO:
Mr Hou pursues a Ma Ying-jeou 2.0-type policy, said Associate Professor Hoo Tiang Boon of Nanyang Technological University.
“If you recall what happened during Ma’s (presidency), nobody actually talked about cross-strait tension. If they can restart dialogue, there’s a possibility Hou and Xi may even meet to build on some kind of positive political momentum,” he said.
But the KMT will have to play its cards right, he said, bearing in mind the “2014 Sunflower Movement” where protestors occupied the Legislative Yuan to oppose the then-ruling KMT’s attempt to push through the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement without a clause-by-clause review.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO:
For Dr Huang, it would be if the KMT “goes off on its own to negotiate something that deviates from the public’s preference and priorities”.
Another worst-case scenario is if the Chinese government does not take the KMT seriously and continues to put military pressure on Taiwan, resulting in miscalculation or a prolonged period of tension, he said.
Sketching out another possibility, Dr Qi said: “Beijing is overly eager to push for unification but Hou has to resist it as the Taiwanese public does not support it. Then Beijing significantly increases pressure on Taipei, triggering Washington’s and Taipei’s pushback, which in turn leads to cross-strait and regional instability.”
KO WEN-JE (TPP)
Dr Ko, 64, was a trauma surgeon and university professor before entering politics. He was elected Taipei mayor in 2014 as an independent candidate backed by the DPP, but has shifted to a more China-friendly approach in recent years.
He founded the TPP in 2019 as an alternative to the two traditional parties and has attracted younger voters with his seemingly candid manner and use of social media.
He has developed “more of a cult of personality than somebody who has built up strong or deep party platforms or ties”, said Dr Huang.
Dr Ko has opposed Taiwan independence and spoken of the need for exchanges and dialogue with China, prioritising “deterrence and communication”.
On the issue of the 1992 Consensus, he has said he would deal with it pragmatically. If asked by China about it, he recently said his answer would be: “There doesn’t seem to be a market for this in Taiwan. Should we change the name of the term?”
While Dr Ko has not explicitly endorsed the Consensus, he has said people on both sides of the strait are “one family”.
Dr Ko is trying to play a finely calibrated game and distinguish himself from the KMT and DPP, said Associate Prof Hoo.
“He tries to paint himself as a third force who can bring self-proclaimed new ideas into the policy and cross-strait space. He criticises DPP’s cross-strait position as reckless and risky, and the KMT’s position as being too conciliatory towards China,” Hoo said.
“He’s trying to carve out some kind of niche position or middle ground between the KMT and DPP – if there’s one that exists.”
When he was Mayor, Dr Ko jointly organised an annual Taipei-Shanghai City forum and visited China 18 times. This indicates China accepts him as a politician and leader, said Associate Prof Hoo, who reckoned the Chinese government would still prefer Mr Hou to win the election, but sees Dr Ko as “an acceptable second choice”.
His pragmatism could pose both opportunity and danger to the Chinese government, said Dr Huang. “Opportunity because he will probably be willing to forego the political extreme option of pursuing outright independence. But it’s also dangerous because you never know what to expect from him if he has no core principles of what he actually stands for in terms of cross-strait relations.”
Should Dr Ko win, the US, China and Southeast Asia will probably wait and see who he appoints to portfolios like foreign affairs and mainland affairs, said Dr Huang.
“He doesn’t have a core team that can function immediately if he were to be elected. So after day one, he’s going to need to rely on political advisors, experienced hands from both sides of the aisle,” he said, referring to DPP and KMT personnel.
BEST-CASE SCENARIO:
Dr Ko puts in place steady and experienced hands in government, with no major tweaks or surprises in the policy of the past eight years, said Dr Huang. This would reassure Washington, Beijing and Southeast Asian countries.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO:
For Associate Prof Hoo, this would be if Dr Ko declines to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus or says it’s something he is open to in the future.
“Beijing could change its impression of him and if formal dialogue is not resumed, this will continue the window of misperception, misunderstanding and friction,” he said.
For Dr Huang, it would be Dr Ko declaring something that has not been checked by his advisors and is unacceptable or provocative to the Taiwanese, or to China or the US. “That could disrupt the balance that we’ve seen in the status quo in the last eight years.”
END
